CVE-2026-120699
CubeSandbox is an instant, concurrent, secure, and lightweight …
CubeSandbox is an instant, concurrent, secure, and lightweight sandbox for AI agents. Prior to 0.5.1, any authenticated tenant permitted to call POST /sandboxes can supply metadata["host-mount"] with an arbitrary existing host path because the control plane performs no authorization check or allowed-prefix validation for the path. injectHostDirMounts forwards the path to prepareHostDirVolume, where Cubelet uses mount --rbind through the function to perform a recursive bind mount as root and exposes the host subtree to the tenant's MicroVM through virtio-fs, read-write by default. This allows host-root file access and modification, host code execution, access to the container runtime, and compromise of co-resident tenants without a kernel or virtual-machine-monitor flaw. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.1.
What to do now
- Check your exposureFind out whether the affected software runs anywhere in your environment, including systems of suppliers.
- UpdateInstall the version in which the vendor fixed the vulnerability. The references lead to the advisory.
- Set the orderSystems that can be reached from the internet come first, then the rest.
References
- github.com/TencentCloud/CubeSandbox/commit/5c7025f3a393c30e723dd7f071ef1c28d7a2e52e
- github.com/TencentCloud/CubeSandbox/pull/756
- github.com/TencentCloud/CubeSandbox/releases/tag/v0.5.1
- github.com/TencentCloud/CubeSandbox/security/advisories/GHSA-8frp-jfpv-5vhv
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-120699
- cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-120699
Data: CVE list and the NVD. This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.