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Vulnerabilities · 2026

CVE-2026-44670
Go vulnerability

## Summary The kernel stores Attribute View (AV / database) names without any HTML escape, then a render template uses raw `strings.ReplaceAll(tpl, "${avName}", nodeAvName)` to embed the name in HTML before pushing to all clients via WebSocket. Three independent client paths (`render.ts:120` → `outerHTML`, `Title.ts:401` → `innerHTML`, `transaction.ts:559` → `innerHTML`) consume the value without escaping. Because the main BrowserWindow runs `nodeIntegration:true, contextIsolation:false, webSecurity:false` (`app/electron/main.js:407-411`), HTML injection in the renderer becomes Node.js code execution. Payload is stored on disk under `data/storage/av/<id>.json`, replicates via every sync transport (S3 / WebDAV / cloud), survives `.sy.zip` export-import, and triggers for any role (Administrator / Editor / Reader / publish-service Visitor) opening a doc bound to the AV. ## Details **Kernel write — no escape.** `kernel/model/attribute_view.go:3244-3255`: ```go attrView.Name = strings.TrimSpace(operation.Data.(string)) attrView.Name = strings.ReplaceAll(attrView.Name, "\n", " ") if 512 < utf8.RuneCountInString(attrView.Name) { attrView.Name = gulu.Str.SubStr(attrView.Name, 512) } err = av.SaveAttributeView(attrView) // ← no html.EscapeString ``` **Kernel template — raw replace.** `kernel/model/attribute_view.go:3242,3283-3284`: ```go const attrAvNameTpl = `<span data-av-id="${avID}" ... class="popover__block">${avName}</span>` // ... tpl := strings.ReplaceAll(attrAvNameTpl, "${avID}", nodeAvID) tpl = strings.ReplaceAll(tpl, "${avName}", nodeAvName) // ← raw ``` **Sink #1 — AV body header → outerHTML.** `app/src/protyle/render/av/render.ts:120` (returned from `genTabHeaderHTML`, written via outerHTML at `render.ts:596`): ```ts <div contenteditable="${editable}" ... data-title="${data.name || ""}" ...>${data.name || ""}</div> // ... e.firstElementChild.outerHTML = `<div class="av__container">${genTabHeaderHTML(...)}...</div>`; ``` Same pattern in `kanban/render.ts:227` and `gallery/render.ts:142`. **Sink #2 — Doc title attribute strip → innerHTML.** `app/src/protyle/header/Title.ts:396-403`: ```ts response.data.attrViews.forEach((item: { id: string, name: string }) => { avTitle += `<span data-av-id="${item.id}" ... class="popover__block">${item.name}</span>&nbsp;`; }); nodeAttrHTML += `<div class="protyle-attr--av">...${avTitle}</div>`; this.element.querySelector(".protyle-attr").innerHTML = nodeAttrHTML; ``` **Sink #3 — WebSocket `updateAttrs` push → innerHTML.** `app/src/protyle/wysiwyg/transaction.ts:549-562,659`: ```ts const escapeHTML = Lute.EscapeHTMLStr(data.new[key]); if (key === "bookmark") { bookmarkHTML = `...${escapeHTML}...`; } else if (key === "name") { nameHTML = `...${escapeHTML}...`; } else if (key === "alias") { aliasHTML = `...${escapeHTML}...`; } else if (key === "memo") { memoHTML = `...${escapeHTML}...`; } else if (key === "custom-avs" && data.new["av-names"]) { avHTML = `<div class="protyle-attr--av">...${data.new["av-names"]}</div>`; // ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ raw, unlike the four siblings above } // ... attrElement.innerHTML = nodeAttrHTML + Constants.ZWSP; ``` The four sibling cases use `Lute.EscapeHTMLStr` — proving the team knows the right pattern; only `av-names` was missed. **Renderer posture — RCE multiplier.** `app/electron/main.js:407-411`: ```js webPreferences: { nodeIntegration: true, webviewTag: true, webSecurity: false, contextIsolation: false, } ``` **Reachability.** Route `/api/transactions setAttrViewName` requires `CheckAuth + CheckAdminRole + CheckReadonly`. On default install (`Conf.AccessAuthCode == ""`), `kernel/model/session.go:261-287` auto-grants Administrator to local-origin requests. The Origin check accepts `localhost` / loopback only **but `chrome-extension://` is explicitly allowlisted** (`session.go:277`), so any installed browser extension calls the API as admin. Local clients with no Origin header (CLI tools) also pass. ## Suggested fix 1. `kernel/model/attribute_view.go getAvN

Affected products

Go. The exact versions are in the references.

What to do now

  • Check your exposureFind out whether Go runs anywhere in your environment, including systems of suppliers.
  • UpdateInstall the version in which the vendor fixed the vulnerability. The references lead to the advisory.
  • Set the orderSystems that can be reached from the internet come first, then the rest.

References

Data: CVE list and the NVD. This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.