CVE-2026-44850
Go vulnerability
## Summary Portainer offers an environment-level **Disable bind mounts for non-administrators** security setting that blocks regular users from binding host paths into containers they create through the Portainer-mediated Docker API. The check that enforces this setting only inspected the legacy `HostConfig.Binds` array on the container-create proxy and never looked at the equivalent `HostConfig.Mounts` array. Any authenticated user with rights to create containers on a Docker environment where the restriction is enabled could submit a `bind`-typed entry under `HostConfig.Mounts` and mount any host path into their container. The two fields are interchangeable on the Docker daemon — both produce real bind mounts at runtime — so a check that inspects only one is functionally equivalent to no check at all. The same primitive is correctly enforced on Swarm service create against `TaskTemplate.ContainerSpec.Mounts`; the gap was specific to the `POST /containers/create` proxy path. Exploitation requires a regular user with container-create rights on an environment that has the restriction enabled. Such a user can mount any host path read-write or read-only into a container they own and use the resulting view of the host filesystem to read or write anything the Docker daemon's user can — typically `root`. Bind-mount restriction is the primary defence against host filesystem exposure on shared environments where regular users are otherwise permitted to deploy containers. ## Severity **High** The vulnerability is exploitable over the network with low attack complexity, no attack requirement, and no user interaction. It requires a low-privilege authenticated session — any regular user with container-create rights on an environment where the bind-mount restriction is enabled. The vulnerable system (the Portainer container-create proxy) suffers a confidentiality and integrity breach by virtue of the bypass itself, but the dominant impact is on the subsequent system: the Docker host's filesystem and any container running alongside the attacker's. This is a restriction bypass rather than a cross-authority escalation — the user already had container-create rights, and the bind-mount restriction is a defence-in-depth control on top of that capability — which is the reason the rating is held at High rather than promoted to Critical despite the host-level reach. ## Affected Versions The vulnerability has existed since the `AllowBindMountsForRegularUsers` security setting was introduced. The `HostConfig.Mounts` field has never been inspected by the container-create proxy on any release line. Fixes are included in the following releases: | Branch | First vulnerable | Fixed in | |--------------|------------------|------------| | 2.33.x (LTS) | 2.33.0 | **2.33.8** | | 2.39.x (LTS) | 2.39.0 | **2.39.2** | | 2.41.x (STS) | all prior | **2.41.0** | Portainer releases prior to 2.33.0 are end-of-life and will not receive a fix. Users on EOL versions should upgrade to a supported LTS branch. ## Workarounds Administrators who cannot immediately upgrade can reduce exposure by: - **Revoke container-create rights from non-administrator accounts on affected environments.** If the bind-mount restriction is being relied on as a hard guarantee, audit which non-administrator accounts have container-create rights on environments where it is set, and downgrade those accounts to roles that lack container-create until the patched release is deployed. Stack and service deployment that depends on container-create will stop working for those users until the patched release is in place. - **Audit recent container creations for `HostConfig.Mounts` of `Type: bind` from non-admin Portainer users.** Inspect Docker daemon logs and `docker inspect` output on affected environments. Any non-admin-created container with a bind-typed `Mounts` entry should be treated as a potential incident. - **Segregate tenants by environment.** Where the per-environment toggle was being used to
Affected products
Go. The exact versions are in the references.
What to do now
- Check your exposureFind out whether Go runs anywhere in your environment, including systems of suppliers.
- UpdateInstall the version in which the vendor fixed the vulnerability. The references lead to the advisory.
- Set the orderSystems that can be reached from the internet come first, then the rest.
References
- github.com/portainer/portainer/security/advisories/GHSA-7fw3-x4r2-g7wc
- github.com/portainer/portainer/releases/tag/2.33.8
- github.com/portainer/portainer/releases/tag/2.39.2
- github.com/portainer/portainer/releases/tag/2.41.0
- github.com/advisories/GHSA-7fw3-x4r2-g7wc
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44850
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44850
- cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-44850
Data: CVE list and the NVD. This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.