CVE-2026-45262
Packagist vulnerability
## Summary > **Live PoC verified 2026-04-30** against a stock FacturaScripts master at `127.0.0.1:8081`. A scoped `ApiKey` with `fullaccess=0` and an `ApiAccess` row granting `allowget=1` on the `clientes` resource only (no other rights, no UI session, no admin) issued one `GET /api/3/clientes?filter[(0)UNION%20SELECT%20...]=` request and the response body contained the raw bcrypt hash of the admin user's password (`$2y$12$sLfA/XCqnjqLmYJwK.2V7eUHrHTHcQfkTYYfs1.lxX3OHrsmmkMGO`) and the admin's `logkey` cookie value. The leaked `logkey` was injected into a fresh cookie jar and `GET /AdminPlugins` returned 200 with the admin plugin management UI. End-to-end account takeover from a read-only token with no CSRF, no second factor, no rate-limit interaction beyond the default 5-incident IP throttle. `Core/Where.php::sqlColumn()` exempts any field name that contains both `(` and `)` from identifier escaping. The two API filter builders (`APIModel::getWhereValues` and `ApiAttachedFiles::getWhereValues`) feed the raw request key (`$_GET['filter'][$key]`) straight into `new DataBaseWhere($key, $value, '=', ...)`. When the model's `all()` reaches `Where::multiSqlLegacy` -> `Where::sql()` -> `Where::sqlColumn($key)`, the parenthesis branch returns the attacker-controlled string unmodified. The string is concatenated into `WHERE <attacker> = '<value>'`, which an attacker can pivot to `WHERE (0)UNION SELECT ... FROM users WHERE(nick='admin')-- = 'value'`, leaking arbitrary columns from any table. ## Details ### the API filter pipeline never validates filter keys `Core/Lib/API/APIModel.php:300-322` (`listAll`): ```php protected function listAll(): bool { $filter = $this->request->query->getArray('filter'); $limit = $this->request->query->getInt('limit', 50); $offset = $this->request->query->getInt('offset', 0); $operation = $this->request->query->getArray('operation'); $order = $this->request->query->getArray('sort'); // obtenemos los registros $data = []; $hidden = $this->model->getApiFieldsToHide(); $where = $this->getWhereValues($filter, $operation); foreach ($this->model->all($where, $order, $offset, $limit) as $item) { $data[] = $this->filterHidden($item->toArray(true), $hidden); } ... ``` `Core/Lib/API/APIModel.php:231-298` (`getWhereValues`): ```php private function getWhereValues($filter, $operation, $defaultOperation = 'AND'): array { $where = []; foreach ($filter as $key => $value) { $field = $key; // (1) raw request key $operator = '='; switch (substr($key, -3)) { // suffix routing only case '_gt': $field = substr($key, 0, -3); $operator = '>'; break; case '_is': $field = substr($key, 0, -3); $operator = 'IS'; break; case '_lt': $field = substr($key, 0, -3); $operator = '<'; break; } ... if (!isset($operation[$key])) { $operation[$key] = $defaultOperation; } $where[] = new DataBaseWhere($field, $value, $operator, $operation[$key]); // (2) } return $where; } ``` The function only ever reads the suffix to decide an operator. The remaining identifier - up to 252 characters in MariaDB and unrestricted by the framework - is preserved verbatim and handed to `DataBaseWhere`. There is no allow-list of legal column names, no `preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*$/')` like the autocomplete hardening in `BaseController::autocompleteAction` (commit `b8aa78b`), and no plug-in hook through which the operator could intervene. The exact same code (line-for-line, plus a `files` parameter) lives in `Core/Controller/ApiAttachedFiles.php::getWhereValues` (lines 172-239), so the bug is present on both the generic `/api/3/<resource>` route and the dedicated `/api/3/attachedfiles` route. ### `DataBaseWhere::getSQLWhere` now delegates to `Where::multiSqlLegacy` `Core/Base/DataBase/DataBaseWhere.php` is marked `@deprecated` and the active code path runs through `Core/Where.php::multiSqlLegacy` (lines 151-199), which converts each legacy `DataBaseWhere` instance to a `Where`: ```php if ($item instanceof DataBaseWhere) { $dbWhere = new self($item->fields, $
Affected products
Packagist. The exact versions are in the references.
What to do now
- Check your exposureFind out whether Packagist runs anywhere in your environment, including systems of suppliers.
- UpdateInstall the version in which the vendor fixed the vulnerability. The references lead to the advisory.
- Set the orderSystems that can be reached from the internet come first, then the rest.
References
Data: CVE list and the NVD. This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.