CVE-2026-48025
Go vulnerability
`internal/pki/resolver.go:36-64` constructs a `CAManager` with the plaintext `ed25519.PrivateKey` after unwrapping via the master key; `internal/pki/ca.go:13-16` stores it. Callers at `internal/api/enroll.go:116`, `internal/api/updates.go:297`, and `internal/api/mobile_bundle.go:40` use the manager for one `Sign()` and drop the reference on function return — but the underlying slice contents are not wiped before release. The keystore package's contract (`internal/keystore/keystore.go` doc: *"Callers MUST zeroise the returned plaintext DEK as soon as it is no longer needed"*) is not met by the `CAManager` consumer. Decrypted CA private keys persist in process heap until Go's GC scavenges the underlying slice — minutes to hours under load, indefinitely on idle servers. ## Affected All released versions up to v0.3.6. ## Threat model Memory-read access: core dump, ptrace, kernel swap to disk, container/VM snapshot, OOM-debug bundle, side-channel via shared cache lines. Not a remote-network vulnerability, but defeats the master-key + envelope-encryption design's promise of "private key never lingers". ## Suggested fix Add a `Wipe()` method on `CAManager`: ```go // internal/pki/ca.go func (m *CAManager) Wipe() { if m == nil { return } keystore.Zeroize(m.caKey) } ``` At each call site (`enroll.go:116`, `updates.go:297`, `mobile_bundle.go:40`, and any new caller), `defer caMgr.Wipe()` immediately after the `Resolve()` call. Pattern mirrors the existing `defer keystore.Zeroize(dek)` discipline in the keystore package. Optional follow-up: wrap `m.Sign()` to zeroize after each call, removing the contract on callers — but the `defer` pattern is sufficient as a minimum.
Affected products
Go. The exact versions are in the references.
What to do now
- Check your exposureFind out whether Go runs anywhere in your environment, including systems of suppliers.
- UpdateInstall the version in which the vendor fixed the vulnerability. The references lead to the advisory.
- Set the orderSystems that can be reached from the internet come first, then the rest.
References
- github.com/juev/nebula-mesh/security/advisories/GHSA-8h84-fhqq-q58v
- github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/commit/bca1d5914fbaf3517d3b86145a802c00de4a8122
- github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/releases/tag/v0.3.7
- github.com/advisories/GHSA-8h84-fhqq-q58v
- github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/security/advisories/GHSA-8h84-fhqq-q58v
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48025
- cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-48025
Data: CVE list and the NVD. This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.