CVE-2026-55096
fast-mcp-telegram is a Telegram MCP Server. Prior to version 30.1, …
fast-mcp-telegram is a Telegram MCP Server. Prior to version 30.1, the send_message/send_message_to_phone MCP tools accept files as a list of http(s) URLs, which the server downloads and attaches to the outgoing Telegram message. Downloads are guarded by _validate_url_security, an SSRF denylist that checks the URL's literal hostname string but never resolves DNS. The fetch (httpx.AsyncClient.get) does its own resolution at request time. Consequently a hostname that resolves to a loopback / private / link-local address passes the guard and is fetched — even with the secure defaults block_private_ips=True and allow_http_urls=False. Because the fetched body is returned to the attacker as a Telegram file attachment, this is a full-read, exfiltrating SSRF, not blind. This issue has been patched in version 30.1.
What to do now
- Check your exposureFind out whether the affected software runs anywhere in your environment, including systems of suppliers.
- UpdateInstall the version in which the vendor fixed the vulnerability. The references lead to the advisory.
- Set the orderSystems that can be reached from the internet come first, then the rest.
References
- github.com/leshchenko1979/fast-mcp-telegram/commit/e6b3032cfc906e14f5b84f2c2b8ec378eb457e5
- github.com/leshchenko1979/fast-mcp-telegram/releases/tag/0.30.1
- github.com/leshchenko1979/fast-mcp-telegram/security/advisories/GHSA-xr72-j7vj-vp7g
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55096
- cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-55096
Data: CVE list and the NVD. This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.