CVE-2026-61810
libspdm is a sample implementation that follows the DMTF SPDM …
libspdm is a sample implementation that follows the DMTF SPDM specifications. In version 1.4.0, both the FINISH request (Table 80) and the FINISH_RSP response (Table 81) gained two new fields, OpaqueDataLength and OpaqueData, placed before the trailing signed/authenticated field. The transcript definitions used to compute and verify the FINISH signature, the FINISH HMAC (RequesterVerifyData), and the FINISH_RSP HMAC (ResponderVerifyData) were not updated and still terminate with a step of the form. Per DSP0274, the "SPDM Header Fields" are only the four header bytes (SPDMVersion, RequestResponseCode, Param1, Param2). A literal reading therefore excludes OpaqueDataLength and OpaqueData, even though those fields are transmitted before the trailing signature/HMAC field. Because the signature/HMAC must cover every field transmitted before it to "protect the entire handshake against manipulation by an active attacker," an active attacker could otherwise modify the opaque data in flight without invalidating the signature or HMAC. This issue has been patched in version 1.4.1.
What to do now
- Check your exposureFind out whether the affected software runs anywhere in your environment, including systems of suppliers.
- UpdateInstall the version in which the vendor fixed the vulnerability. The references lead to the advisory.
- Set the orderSystems that can be reached from the internet come first, then the rest.
References
Data: CVE list and the NVD. This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.