CVE-2026-18089
Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication …
Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass by verifying responses against the response-embedded certificate in verify_xml when no trust anchor is configured. verify_xml in Net::SAML2::Role::VerifyXML runs "return if !$anchors && !$cacert;" as soon as the XML::Sig check succeeds, and that check uses the X.509 certificate taken from the response's own dsig:KeyInfo/dsig:X509Certificate element, so an unanchored response is checked only against the key it carries. Binding::POST declares cacert as an optional Maybe[Str] with no default, so a POST binding built without one takes that path, and _verify_encrypted_assertion returns early the same way with "return $xml unless $cacert;". Any caller that constructs Binding::POST or calls Assertion->new_from_xml without a cacert, cert_text, or anchors argument accepts a response signed by an attacker generated key whose self-signed certificate is embedded in that response, authenticating an arbitrary assertion.
What to do now
- Check your exposureFind out whether the affected software runs anywhere in your environment, including systems of suppliers.
- UpdateInstall the version in which the vendor fixed the vulnerability. The references lead to the advisory.
- Set the orderSystems that can be reached from the internet come first, then the rest.
References
- metacpan.org/release/TIMLEGGE/Net-SAML2-0.85/source/lib/Net/SAML2/Binding/POST.pm#L21
- metacpan.org/release/TIMLEGGE/Net-SAML2-0.85/source/lib/Net/SAML2/Protocol/Assertion.pm#L8
- metacpan.org/release/TIMLEGGE/Net-SAML2-0.85/source/lib/Net/SAML2/Role/VerifyXML.pm#L32
- metacpan.org/release/TIMLEGGE/Net-SAML2-0.88/source/Changes
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-18089
- cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-18089
Data: CVE list and the NVD. This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.