CVE-2026-53604
nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh …
nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Prior to version 0.3.8, the web handler renderMobileBundle passes the real *pki.CAResolver directly into mobilebundle.Build. Inside Build, resolver.LoadByID decrypts the CA's ed25519 private key into a *pki.CAManager, but Build never calls CAManager.Wipe() on any return path. As a result, when a mobile-bundle request goes through the web UI and Build returns — especially on error (missing network, invalid prefix, DB error, signing failure) — the plaintext CA private key remains on the Go heap, unwiped, until garbage collection. An attacker able to read process memory (core dump, swap, memory-scraping) can recover the CA signing key, which would allow minting arbitrary host certificates for the mesh. The API handler already does this correctly: it loads the CAManager, defer caMgr.Wipe(), and wraps it in caManagerResolver. Only the web path is affected. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.8.
What to do now
- Check your exposureFind out whether the affected software runs anywhere in your environment, including systems of suppliers.
- UpdateInstall the version in which the vendor fixed the vulnerability. The references lead to the advisory.
- Set the orderSystems that can be reached from the internet come first, then the rest.
References
- github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/security/advisories/GHSA-2p2f-px33-4vv5
- github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/commit/1f1ab9aa8472239763d967e3d50a3cd53a1a79b9
- github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/releases/tag/v0.3.8
- github.com/advisories/GHSA-2p2f-px33-4vv5
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53604
- cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-53604
Data: CVE list and the NVD. This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.