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Vulnerabilities · 2026

CVE-2026-82976
A flaw was found in the image-customization-controller used in …

A flaw was found in the image-customization-controller used in OpenShift's bare metal provisioning stack. The controller registers an HTTP file server on port 8084 with no authentication. The custom imageFileSystem implementation exposes a browsable HTML directory listing of all registered images at the root path. The only access control on per-host images is the random UUID filename; the directory listing discloses those UUIDs to any caller on the provisioning network. Each served image embeds an Ignition config containing the base64-encoded cluster pull secret, optional IRONIC_RAMDISK_SSH_KEY, proxy settings, and per-host NetworkManager keyfiles. An adjacent network attacker can enumerate all image UUIDs via directory listing, download any image, extract the embedded Ignition config, and recover the cluster pull secret and SSH key. ### Evidence **pkg/imagehandler/imagefilesystem.go — root directory is browsable and enumerates all UUID image names** ```go func (f *imageFileSystem) Readdir(n int) ([]fs.FileInfo, error) { f.mu.Lock() defer f.mu.Unlock() result := []fs.FileInfo{} for _, im := range f.images { result = append(result, im) } return result, nil } func (f *imageFileSystem) Open(name string) (http.File, error) { f.log.Info("Open", "path", name) if name == "/" { return f, nil } ... ``` **cmd/controller/main.go — file server bound on all interfaces without auth or TLS** ```go http.Handle("/", http.FileServer(imageServer.FileSystem())) go func() { server := &http.Server{ Addr: imagesBindAddr, // default ":8084" ReadHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second, } err := server.ListenAndServe() ``` **pkg/ignition/service_config.go:94-100 — pull secret is embedded in every served image** ```go func (b *ignitionBuilder) authFile() ignition_config_types_32.File { source := "data:;base64," + strings.TrimSpace(b.ironicAgentPullSecret) return ignition_config_types_32.File{ Node: ignition_config_types_32.Node{Path: "/etc/authfile.json"}, ... ``` ### Attack Pattern Adjacent provisioning-network client → GET / lists UUID image names → download ISO/initramfs → extract embedded Ignition → recover cluster pull secret and SSH key.

What to do now

  • Check your exposureFind out whether the affected software runs anywhere in your environment, including systems of suppliers.
  • UpdateInstall the version in which the vendor fixed the vulnerability. The references lead to the advisory.
  • Set the orderSystems that can be reached from the internet come first, then the rest.

References

Data: CVE list and the NVD. This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.